This paper investigates the spread of what started as a crisis at the core of the global financial system to emerging economies. While emerging economies had exhibited some resilience through the early stages of the financial turmoil that began in the summer of 2007, they have been hit hard since mid-2008. Their deteriorating fortunes are only partly attributable to the collapse in world trade and sharp drop in commodity prices. Things were made worse by emerging markets' exposure to the turmoil in global finance itself. As "innocent bystanders," even countries that had taken out "self-insurance" proved vulnerable to the global "sudden stop" in capital flows. We critique loanable funds theoretical interpretations of global imbalances and offer an alternative explanation that emphasizes the special status of the U.S. dollar. Instead of taking out even more self-insurance, developing countries should pursue capital account management to enlarge their policy space and reduce external vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
Until the mid-2008, the "decoupling hypothesis"-that emerging markets would be sufficiently strong to escape infection from troubles at the core of the world economy-had currency among commentators and market players alike. In retrospect, emerging economies did indeed exhibit some resilience through the early stages of the financial turmoil that began in the summer of 2007, but they got hit hard in the second half of 2008. This paper investigates the spreading of what started as a crisis at the core of the global financial system to emerging economies. It argues that emerging economies' infection is only partly attributable to the collapse in world trade and sharp drop in commodity prices. Matters were made worse by exposures to the turmoil in global finance. The analysis focuses on countries that had taken out "self-insurance" and were able to avoid drawing on IMF help. Even in their case, however, self-insurance proved to be of limited effectiveness against the global "sudden stop" of 2008.
The analysis begins with a broad overview of the channels of transmission and crisis contagion in section 2. In section 3, a sample of 14 leading emerging economies then provides the basis for a comparative country analysis of the global crisis. Addressing some critical systemic issues regarding self-insurance and the implied need for someone to underwrite such self-insurance, section 4 critiques the loanable funds theoretical interpretations of global imbalances and offers an alternative explanation that emphasizes the special status of the U.S. dollar. The concluding section 5 discusses the policy options available to developing countries in light of the crisis experience, arguing in favor of capital account management to enlarge policy space and reduce external vulnerabilities.
DECOUPLING, INFECTION, RECOUPLING: CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION AND CONTAGION
Arguably, the global equity market sell-off in late February and March 2007 provided the first warning of things to come. Rising delinquencies and defaults on subprime mortgages had started to cause some concerns earlier in December 2006. Announcements by HSBC of a higher-thanexpected charge on its U.S. subprime loan portfolio for 2006 and a plunge on the Shanghai stock exchange then combined to send a shockwave through global equity markets. "Subprime king" New Century Financial Corporation became the first prominent lender to go under in what was soon labeled the "subprime mortgage crisis" (Richardson and Zuckerman 2007; Zuckerman 2007 ). Yet as the Federal Reserve refrained from following through with a widely expected rate hike on March 21, dropping its tightening bias, markets recovered and reached new highs in the spring.
Not for long though. Market stress reemerged in June 2007 as several European banks and investment vehicles became implicated in subprime-mortgage-related losses and experienced funding problems as a result (Germany's IKB and France's BNP Paribas, for instance). August 9, 2007 marks the definite beginning of the severe turmoil at the core of the global financial system, forcing central banks to provide emergency liquidity as interest rates shot up and money markets seized up.
At this early stage, a prominent theme among commentators was that the turmoil might be contained as emerging market economies "decouple" from slowing growth in advanced economies (see Bergsten [2008] , for instance). The IMF's World Economic Outlook of October 2007 also nourished the idea that emerging economies were strong enough to decouple from the storm that was building up force at the center of global finance, observing that "strong domestic demand growth in emerging market economies should continue to be a key driver of global growth, with more robust public balance sheets and policy frameworks providing scope for most countries to weather some weakening in external demand. Indeed, somewhat slower capital inflows from the torrid pace of the first half of 2007 may serve to ease concerns about excessive currency appreciation or too rapid credit growth" (IMF 2007) . While risks to domestic demand were seen as downward in advanced economies, they were judged as "broadly balanced" in emerging economies.
The IMF became slightly more cautious in its April 2008 World Economic Outlook referring to "divergence" rather than full "decoupling." In any case, the Fund confirmed that developing and emerging economies had a remarkable resilience. This new found resilience was attributable, in the Fund's view, to sound policy choices since "most emerging and developing economies have maintained disciplined macroeconomic policies in recent years, bringing down fiscal deficits and reducing inflation. Public balance sheets have been strengthened, and external vulnerabilities have been substantially reduced as international reserves have risen to historic highs and reliance on external borrowing has been largely contained" (IMF 2008) .
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USD billions
-1,500 To summarize this overview of broad trends and developments before and during the crisis, the infection of the developing world with the disease spreading from the core of global finance in advanced economies happened through both trade and finance channels. While the collapse in trade was highly synchronous across the globe, private capital flows at first followed the decoupling theme and flooded emerging markets, to then ebb abruptly-hitting with a vengeance delayed by about one year, which completed the recoupling of emerging market countries with advanced economies (see BIS [2009] buyers perceived to be more severely credit constrained will also encourage exporters to reduce their own risk exposures. In conjunction with the increased role of global supply chains in justin-time production for international trade (see Escaith [2009] , for instance), disruptions in trade financing operations further reinforced imploding trade multipliers. In short, in the sphere of trade finance, too, global finance also proved non-neutral and rather contagious in spreading the crisis globally. Further investigating the disruptive forces of global finance as they showed up in multifarious forms around the globe, the next section pays particular attention to emerging markets that had taken out "self-insurance" in their pursuit of disciplined macroeconomic policies.
EFFECTIVENESS OF "SELF-INSURANCE"?
The decoupling hypothesis was based on the idea that disciplined macroeconomic policies had established strong fundamentals across much of the emerging market universe, including strong fiscal and external positions and low inflation. Policy choices in these countries judged as sound featured competitive exchange rates, current account surplus positions, and huge FX reserve holdings. Robust fundamentals established by such "self-insurance" policies would immunize countries against external shocks and contagion, allowing emerging markets to decouple from the faltering core, or so the story went. A look at the group of countries that was hit hard enough by "sudden reversals" in private capital flows to need to call in the IMF for their rescue would seem to provide some support for these ideas since these were invariably countries that had large current account deficits when global crisis struck, particularly central and eastern European (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. 8 Of more interest are therefore countries that got away without IMF help. This section will focus on a select group of 14 leading emerging economies, namely Argentina, Brazil, China, Columbia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation, South Africa, and Turkey. There was some deployment of reserves in the final quarter to counter the real's plunge. The overall picture emerging from these findings here confirms that emerging markets experienced the repercussions of the crisis at the core of global finance largely as a common event, a sudden stop or reversal in private capital flows that was hitting countries quite indiscriminately, even countries that had appeared to be in a "sound and safe" position due to robust fundamentals. As to the composition of capital flows, the current crisis also confirmed Whether countries had a surplus or moderate deficit on their current account, depreciation of emerging market currencies against the U.S. dollar represented another common phenomenon, a general flight to quality away from emerging markets (and abrupt carry-trade unwinding that also favored the Japanese yen). Rare exceptions included China and Saudi Arabia-steadfastly maintaining the U.S. dollar peg under adverse conditions. While currency depreciation may be seen as a relief factor in the context of an export plunge, even if providing only minor reprieve in a crisis scenario, it must be remembered that depreciation was not the result of deliberate policy choices, but abruptly thrashed upon countries by markets in panic. Following a period during which emerging market policymakers had been challenged by surging capital inflows and currency appreciation, as the IMF observed in the quotation further above, the opposite challenge was hardly any more welcome. Arguably, crisis contagion across the emerging market universe followed a surge in capital inflows that was driven by, as well as driving, the "decoupling" theme in 2007 and until mid-2008 as the global carry-trade received a final massive boost-before its abrupt implosion.
In conclusion, it seems fair to say, then, that neither initial current account surplus positions nor large FX reserve holdings properly insulated countries from the common external shock. 10 Rather, self-insurance strategies merely provided a certain margin of safety that determined, first of all, whether IMF support was needed in the event and, second, the particular country's policy space for implementing countercyclical policies on their own. No doubt these may well be judged as important advantages offered by self-insurance, retrospectively perhaps, especially as seen by countries that failed to take out sufficient self-insurance. But does it really follow that the best advice we might therefore offer in the light of these experiences is that emerging markets should from now on aim at taking out even more self-insurance?
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It may be rash to jump to that conclusion. While self-insurance (cum neo-mercantilist) strategies have seemingly turned emerging markets into "safe and sound" investment destinations for advanced country investors, it should not be overlooked that the strategy cannot work globally unless somebody out there acts as global "borrower and spender of last resort,"
thereby selling insurance-on demand-along the way. Historically, at first the era of financial liberalization produced a surprising proneness for recurrent financial crises among emerging market countries. As the developing periphery learned their lesson and took out self-insurance instead, turning themselves into "safe and sound" places, financial fragility built up at the advanced core instead. Yet, in the end, as the key reserve currency issuer acting as global insurer became overburdened in meeting the worldwide demand for self-insurance and finally stumbled, emerging market insurees got hit again anyway. In other words, whatever may seem to be the case individually, self-insurance has not reduced global systemic risk, but merely transferred risk from one party, emerging markets, to another, the United States-whose role as key reserve currency issuer (and self-insurance underwriter) is the subject of the next section.
10 Similarly, Berkmen et al. (2009) did not find a statistically significant effect of the stock of reserves on growth revisions. 11 For instance, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2009) suggest that the crisis experience might encourage countries in this direction. Subramanian (2008) recommends that India should step up its self-insurance efforts.
SYSTEMIC ISSUES: GLOBAL IMBALANCES, THE U.S. DOLLAR, AND REBALANCING
The point is that a general tendency among countries to seek protection (or self-insure) by maintaining a competitive exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, through running up current account surpluses and accumulating soaring foreign exchange reserves (predominantly denominated in U.S. dollars), has important systemic implications. In particular, if everybody pushes exports and aspires to accumulate dollar reserves, strong deflationary forces arise in the system as a whole. Luckily, under the prevailing de facto international U.S. dollar standard, global liquidity is not physically constrained as in the case of gold, but generally depends on the evolution of the U.S. balance of payments over time, as well as on U.S. macroeconomic policy decisions at critical junctures. In principle, there are three sources of U.S. dollars made available to the world economy: U.S. current account deficits, private U.S. capital outflows, and official U.S. lending.
It is therefore not clear that U.S. current account deficits inevitably pose a risk to global stability. Much depends on the demand for U.S. assets, global liquidity in particular. The point was made forcefully by the authors of the "Bretton Woods II (BWII) hypothesis," hypothesizing in their influential "Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System" that global imbalances featuring a quasipermanent U.S. current account deficit may be sustainable (Dooley, FolkertsLandau, and Garber 2003) . In this view, global current account imbalances reflected a symbiosis of interests among deficit (United States) and surplus (developing world) countries. The developing world's interest is to sell its products in the large U.S. market as a way of stimulating employment growth and development. The U.S. economy, on the other hand, is flexible enough to tolerate the resulting quasipermanent drag on U.S. income growth, given its comparative advantage in creating safe assets that the periphery wishes to accumulate for precautionary reasons.
While we have a lot of sympathy with the chosen perspective, placing the global monetary and financial order right at the center of an analysis of global "imbalances" that are actually interpreted as a balanced situation, the BWII hypothesis fatefully ignored that the domestic counterpart to the U.S.'s external deficit was based not on (safe) public debts, but on With much of the rest of the world becoming ever keener to export and accumulate dollars, systemic deflationary forces mounted that hit the domestic economy of the key reserve currency issuer by putting downward pressure on wages and prices in general. Given the Federal
Reserve's dual mandate of maintaining price stability and high employment, the Fed was forced to ease its policy stance sufficiently to meet its mandate. Monetary policy encourages private spending by lowering interest rates, easing credit, and boosting asset prices. The Fed battled the jobless recovery following the 2001 recession by keeping rates at low levels for a sustained period of time. Rising household indebtedness seemed fine as long as net worth kept on rising, too-as it did as long as the housing boom lasted. As the rest of the world took out ever more self-insurance, U.S. households' balance sheets became increasingly leveraged and fragile.
Do not overlook that the argument put forward here contrasts in important ways with the "global saving glut hypothesis." Bernanke (2005) argues that "over the past decade a combination of diverse forces has created a significant increase in the global supply of saving-a global saving glut-which helps to explain both the increase in the U.S. current account deficit and the relatively low level of real long-term interest rates in the world today." Of course even the notion of a saving glut as such seems rather suspicious from a Keynesian perspective. This suspicion is confirmed when Bernanke goes on and asserts that "in practice, these countries increased reserves through the expedient of issuing debt to their citizens, thereby mobilizing domestic saving, and then using the proceeds to buy U.S. Treasury securities and other assets.
Effectively, governments have acted as financial intermediaries, channeling domestic saving away from local uses and into international capital markets" (Bernanke 2005 ; italics added).
This last statement clearly reveals loanable funds theory as the theory of interest behind
Bernanke's conjectures about a perceived global saving glut and how that glut supposedly depressed interest rates. Following the classical vision of saving as leading and somehow financing investment, Bernanke's saving glut idea presumes that those "excess savings" in the developing world are already there, waiting to be collected (through national debt issuance) and then invested (in U.S. Treasuries), with developing world governments as intermediaries channeling the saving from poor to rich through international capital markets.
While Bernanke's intuition about the relevance of foreign policies in inducing certain developments in the United States may not be altogether wrong, it is important to see exactly how certain market mechanisms and policy adjustments come into play. Bernanke singled-out financial crises in emerging markets as inducing the observed shift in developing-world current account positions and the related spurt in reserve accumulation. In practice, the said policy shift meant that crisis countries, following currency depreciation, made it their priority to maintain a competitive exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, paired with an eagerness to add to their depleted dollar reserves as a precaution or "self-insurance." To think of any saving glut emerging here that would depress interest rates is a "nonsense theory," as Keynes explained in his General Theory. Instead, as was described above, for the United States as a trade counterparty, such behavior, and the corresponding upward pressure on the U.S. dollar it gives rise to, produces deflationary forces in the domestic economy. The resulting weakness in U.S. labor markets and downward pressures on wages and prices in general will induce the Federal Reserve to ease interest rates as a policy response.
The essential point is that it is not any saving glut that depresses interest rates in any imaginary (classical) capital market, but deficient demand in U.S. product and labor marketsarising from other countries' export-oriented (cum self-insurance) growth strategies-that triggers low interest rate policies from the key global reserve currency issuer. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 All went well as long as it lasted. As the global boom saw emerging markets building up strong fundamentals and becoming ever more attractive destinations for private capital inflows, reserve accumulation (i.e., soaring official inflows into the United States, in particular, as seen in It is important to reemphasize here that the developing world was largely hit as "innocent bystanders" by a crisis at the center of global finance, a crisis nurtured by advanced economies.
We argued above that the BWII hypothesis correctly diagnosed that developing countries were keenly accumulating safe assets (U.S. Treasuries, in particular), but that BWII ignored that U.S.
spending was actually sponsored by unsafe assets fueling the U.S. property boom. We also argued that Bernanke was wrong in suggesting that foreign Treasury purchases sourced from some imaginary "saving glut" depressed interest rates and thereby induced the U.S. property boom. Instead, we argued that low interest rates were essentially the result of easy Federal Their funding was mainly through money markets, also exposing them to roll-over (liquidity) risk. 15 Innovative kinds of risk management principles must have guided bank managers in their 13 While large, global banks could also access the Federal Reserve's liquidity fountain directly through their U.S. branches, provided that they held adequate collateral in that location, smaller banks had to take the indirect route involving the international swap grid between the U.S. Fed and other central banks.
14 In view of the Federal Reserve's mandate it is not clear that the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve as such deserve blame-which is not to suggest change to that mandate. 15 In this context, Baba, McCauley, and Ramaswamy (2009) analyze the role of U.S. dollar money market funds in the crisis. They find that up to August 2008 money market funds received safe heaven inflows that helped the funding of non-U.S. banks. However, following Reserve Primary Fund's "breaking-the-buck" event caused by the Lehman failure, a wholesale run on money market funds cut off non-U.S. banks' funding from this source. As liquidity demand shifted away from riskier commercial paper (CP) and bank certificates of deposit (CD) toward Treasuries and out of money market funds into bank deposits, they conclude that "if U.S. banks received the yearning for yield (and big bonuses). As European financial supervisors were dozing away, their supervisees' leveraged U.S. mortgage engagements first helped to compress credit spreads during the housing boom. Then, as the boom turned bust, European banks were immediately found at the center of what became a global financial crisis as turmoil was not contained locally where fragility had been nurtured. 16 Through deleveraging by global banks and distress selling in asset markets all around by global investors from advanced countries, the crisis spread to the developing world.
In conclusion, widespread reliance on self-insurance strategies through the BWII model has not reduced global systemic risk, but merely transferred risk from EM insurees to the key reserve currency issuer acting as global insurer. Ironically, the crisis at the core of global finance has both once again underlined that emerging markets have every reason to desire taking out self-insurance, while also illustrating that only limited protection is actually obtainable in this way against the unintended consequences of unfettered global finance.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' POLICY OPTIONS?
At the bottom of the global crisis of 2007-09 are systemic deficiencies in the global monetary and financial order. In particular, advanced countries with large current account surpluses, such as Germany and Japan, are not held to account for perpetually freeloading on external demand for their growth. Moreover, financial instabilities created since global finance has been unleashed induced a widespread urge to secure policy space among emerging markets. While far more excusable, the general self-insurance rush saw the global insurer's risk exposure balloon in the form of unsustainable U.S. internal imbalances-until the bubble burst, proving the effectiveness of self-insurance to be limited. Given the U.S. dollar's role as key reserve currency, the U.S.
consumer had been lured in to act as global borrower and spender of last resort-an invitation far too pleasant to let pass by as long as the party went on.
deposits while European banks repurchased their CP and CDs, then the latter needed to bid in the already strained interbank market." See also ECB (2009). 16 Bibow (2009c) argues that apart from Europe's pivotal role in the crisis at the center of global finance, which itself made the crisis an internal crisis from the start, Europe was also simultaneously hit by other, properly homegrown crises stemming from imploding intra-Euroland and intra-EU imbalances. Moreover, Euroland's lack of proper policy defenses made the supposed "island of stability" a drag on global growth. What policy options present themselves to developing countries at this juncture and what would they suggest for the unfolding recovery in the medium term? At the peak of the crisis developing countries had a strong self-interest to stimulate domestic demand as their export motor stalled, with international cooperation helping to forestall a general recourse to beggarthy-neighbor policies. Propelled by a US$586 billion (or 14 percent of GDP) fiscal stimulus program and mind-boggling loan expansion, China has emerged as global leader in the recovery.
Can the emerging market consumer be expected to replace the U.S. consumer and carry the torch for global growth from here on?
Beware that this would be no less than a U-turn in general policy orientation if carried to the point where emerging markets at large returned to the pre-1999 world of running a current account deficit position. While countries followed their short-term self-interest in stimulating domestic demand as their exports plunged, it seems doubtful that the latest crisis experiences may have convinced them that the world has become a safer place in which routine emerging market financial instabilities that characterized the pre-2002 world could be easily avoided.
On the other hand, in case of a continuation or return to previous patterns featuring selfinsurance (cum neo-mercantilist) strategies, renewed pressure would arise for the United States to act as global spender and borrower of last resort, with U.S. trade and current account deficits The need and scope for the United States to play along the BWIII script also depends on whether other advanced countries like Japan and Germany (or Euroland at large) might finally mature and pursue domestic-demand-led growth strategies. In this regard, "dollar diplomacy"
will be the foremost instrument in keeping pressure away from the United States as key reserve currency issuer. As for developing countries, reform of the global order is the key issue. At this point though reform of the global monetary order or evolution towards some multipolar or proper international ("bancor") currency regime seems unlikely for some time. While the establishment of a Financial Stability Board at the G-20 level represented a nice gesture at a time when global systemic financial meltdown was looming, it currently looks like serious reforms to unfettered global finance may not be forthcoming either. In principle, greater collective insurance provision (through the IMF, etc.) should tend to reduce developing countries' recourse to self-insurance (and hence pressure on the United States to act as spender of last resort, too), but IMF distrust in view of past crisis experiences may be too strong without any more fundamental IMF overhaulwith some groups of countries seeking collective insurance mechanisms at a regional level instead.
Capital account management presents itself as an alternative to self-insurance under financial globalization, which is generally available to individual countries unless they have signed away their sovereignty in this area through bilateral or multilateral commitment (Bibow 2008-09; Chandrasekhar 2008; UNCTAD 2009) . 18 In fact, in light of the crisis of 2007-09, developing countries would seem to be well-advised to pursue policies of comprehensive capital account management and cautious financial liberalization at their own pace-in denial of IMF preaching of the alleged, but unproven, universal benefit of the opposite. The above comparative country study may be seen as a step towards a study of factors that tend to make countries more or less vulnerable to the vagaries of global finance, especially as some countries (China and
